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Abstract 
A team from the Naval Postgraduate School conducted a trade-off analysis of in-sourcing 
(i.e., make) versus outsourcing (i.e., buy) the production of legacy parts for ship maintenance 
and modernization with a focus on cost savings given the need for cost-effective sustainment. 
The purpose of the study was to compare the make/buy trade-off for a comparison of 
implementing 3DLST, 3DP, and CPLM for U.S. Navy fleet maintenance and upgrading. Cost 
estimates for in-sourcing and outsourcing were developed as well as the impact of in-
sourcing part production cycle time reduction on fleet readiness assessed. The results have 
several significant implications for fleet maintenance and modernization practice. The results 
indicated that there would be significant potential savings with in-sourcing, suggesting that 
the combination of the three technologies have created a potential shift in the optimal 
acquisition modes for fleet parts. 
Introduction 
Ship maintenance and modernization—repairs and improvements to the existing 
fleet—are central to U.S. naval operations. The current cost-constrained environment within 
the federal government and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), as well as evolving 
threats, require naval leadership to maintain and modernize the fleet to retain technological 
superiority while simultaneously balancing budget cost constraints and extensive operational 
commitments. Maintenance programs play a critical role in meeting these Navy objectives.  
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New technologies can facilitate meeting fleet readiness requirements within current 
cost constraints, but only if those technologies are adopted and applied effectively and 
efficiently on a wide scale. One of the most important issues concerns what work to in-
source within Navy organizations and what work to outsource, that is, the “make versus buy” 
decision. Both in-sourcing and outsourcing have been promoted as cost-savings tools. 
Currently, the research on the impact of new technology adoption on the make/buy decision 
is unclear.  
DoD cost-reduction imperatives have forced a review of ship maintenance and 
modernization tools and methods. The review has found that a particularly acute problem is 
how to acquire one-off (especially legacy) parts. In ship maintenance, often the parts 
required were originally manufactured by now-defunct businesses. Often only one, or a few 
copies, of a given part is required for ship maintenance. Another challenge is the duration 
and cost of the traditional acquisition process when applied to parts, especially when legacy, 
unique, or few parts are needed. When outsourced, fabricating parts involves an extensive 
acquisition process in addition to reverse engineering and manufacturing legacy 
replacement parts. Acquiring a few parts of a given kind from organizations that are not the 
original equipment manufacturer (OEM), a local vendor, and sometimes even from the OEM, 
tends to take longer and cost more than acquiring the lower per unit costs for making many 
copies of a currently manufactured part. Manufacturing small numbers of parts such as 
customized or obsolete components can be very expensive. The loss of the small- and 
medium-size industrial base to support ship maintenance and upgrades leads to very 
expensive manufacturing of custom parts. In the current manufacturing base, custom parts 
are very expensive to design and produce in job shops using traditional methods. Also, 
engineering design changes balloon the costs of projects by creating large numbers of 
customized parts or modifications of existing parts.  
Problem Description 
In a 2013 report on U.S. Air Force sourcing titled Enabling Early Sustainment 
Decisions, Application to F-35 Depot-Level Maintenance, Drew, McGarvey, and Buryk 
(2013) of the RAND Corporation proposed and applied a method for recommending 
sourcing with two dimensions: frequency of need and asset specificity (Figure 1). In this 
framework, “OEM” (upper left in Figure 1) is outsourcing to the original equipment 
manufacturer, “Organic” (upper right in Figure 1) is in-sourcing by the U.S. military, “Spot-
market contract” (lower left in Figure 1) is outsourcing for one or a few of a single part type, 
and “Longer-term contract” (lower right in Figure 1) is long-term outsourcing to (often) a 
different private manufacturer for many parts. 
 
 A Conceptual Sourcing Framework  
(Drew et al., 2013) 
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The RAND study says, in part, 
a unique activity that occurs frequently would be something that the Air Force 
would want to perform with organic assets [i.e., in-source]. That is to say, if 
an activity is unique and the organization requires it frequently, no external 
provider could capture a greater economy of scale than the Air Force (due to 
its uniqueness), and performing it in-house should yield a higher return on 
investment (due to high frequency). However, as that frequency declines and 
if the activity remains unique, it may be difficult for the Air Force to capture 
any return on investment for capital setup costs. (Drew et al., p. 9) 
The kinds of parts replacement studied in the current work are primarily unique and 
few in frequency. The Air Force sourcing solution is to use spot-market contracts (i.e., buy 
from any qualified supplier) if the part is relatively simple or to outsource to the OEM if the 
part is complex. 
3DLST and 3DP have the potential to generate large cost savings by in-sourcing 
production of either type of part. However, it is not clear whether the Navy will capture the 
potential savings if the three technologies are used by private industry. More savings may 
accrue if the technologies are put to use by Navy organizations. However, building these 
internal capabilities, a skilled workforce, and the added capacity for this activity will require a 
substantial initial investment. A cost comparison of outsourcing versus in-sourcing fleet 
maintenance and upgrading operations with these three technologies can provide insight for 
deciding whether the investment provides an acceptable return. A critical implementation 
issue is whether to develop 3DLST, 3DP, and CPLM capabilities within the service (i.e., in-
sourcing) or to have industry make the part (i.e., outsourcing).  
The current study addresses these important issues by attempting to answer the 
following questions: 
1. What are the relative costs of in-sourcing 3DLST, 3DP, and CPLM fleet 
maintenance and modernization compared to outsourcing those same 
operations with contractors? 
2. What cost savings may be captured by the use of 3DLST, 3DP, and CPLM 
for fleet maintenance and modernization if those operations are insourced?  
Background 
The Congressional Research Service defines outsourcing as a decision by the 
government to purchase goods and services from sources outside the affected government 
agency. DoD officials report that “in-sourcing has been, and continues to be, a very effective 
tool for the Department to rebalance the workforce, realign inherently governmental and 
other critical work to government performance, and in many instances to generate resource 
efficiencies” (GAO, 2012, p. 14). Beyond workforce realignment, in-sourcing offers additional 
advantages of cost savings and improved cycle time efficiencies. Table 1 identifies 
advantages and disadvantages to outsourcing for the DoD. 
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 Advantages and Disadvantages of Outsourcing for DoD  
(Marquis, 2011, p. 9) 
 
Additive Manufacturing (3DP), CPLM, and 3DLST Technologies 
Additive Manufacturing 
Additive manufacturing (AM) is often equated to 3DP. For the purposes of the current 
study, the two labels are used interchangably in spite of minor differences in meaning. 
Additive manufacturing is defined by the American National Standards Institute as the 
“process of joining materials to make objects from 3D model data, usually layer upon layer, 
as opposed to subtractive manufacturing methodologies. Synonyms: additive fabrication, 
additive processes, additive techniques, additive layer manufacturing, layer manufacturing 
and freeform fabrication” (Wohlers, 2013). Additive manufacturing is a relatively new 
technology that directly deposits materials to make products by sequentially laying down 
millions of particles in thousands of layers to build up the final component. Three-
dimensional design documents (e.g., from use of 3DLST) direct manufacturing hardware. By 
controlling the movement of the material deposition equipment and the flow of material, the 
process controls where particles are deposited in each layer, thereby creating surfaces, 
shapes, and cavities. Materials can be plastic for fast prototyping, metals, ceramics, or 
human tissue. 3DP has several advantages over traditional manufacturing methods. First, a 
primary advantage is the ability to create almost any product shape, with the only limitation 
being the need for each layer of material to have a layer below it for support, although 
secondary materials can be used to provide support under overhanging component parts 
during manufacturing. Second, whereas traditional methods are subtractive (e.g., using 
traditional methods with lathes), the AM process is additive, greatly reducing waste 
materials. 
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Collaborative Product Life-Cycle Management  
Product life-cycle management addresses the issues related to a product throughout 
its life. Collaborative product life-cycle management (CPLM) works to integrate product life-
cycle management across project participants, time, and technologies. CPLM technology 
provides a common platform to electronically integrate other technologies, such as 3DLST 
images and manufacturing files for additive manufacturing, to enable collaboration among all 
parties involved in a given project across project phases and regardless of their geographic 
location (e.g., on a ship at sea and at a land-based depot). CPLM tools also provide a 
means to store the images and all related maintenance work within a common database 
accessible by all participants in a ship alteration or modernization project. CPLM is defined 
by CIMdata as a strategic business approach applying a consistent set of business solutions 
in support of the collaborative creation, management, dissemination, and use of product 
definition information across the extended enterprise, from concept to end of life (CIMdata, 
2007). It integrates people, processes, and information.  
Specific CPLM tools include technologies that support data exchange, portfolio 
management, digital manufacturing, enterprise application integration, and workflow 
automation. A range of industries has invested in CPLM solutions, including those involved 
in aerospace and defense, automotive and transportation, utilities, process manufacturing, 
and high-tech development and manufacturing. The CPLM market is poised for further 
growth with vendors expanding product offerings as the industry evolves.1  
3DLST 
3DLST scanners create a three-dimentional “point cloud“ of the surface of an object. 
Similar to cameras in some ways, they have a cone-shaped field of view, but can also 
collect distance information about each point, allowing each point to be located in a three-
dimensional space. Usually, multiple scans are required from different directions to capture 
adequate information to create a description of the object. Most manufacturers’ scanners 
work by scanning a target space with a laser light mounted on a highly articulating mount, 
enabling data capture in virtually any orientation with minimal operator input. Some also 
incorporate a digital camera that simultaneously captures a 360° field-of-view color photo 
image of the target. Once the capture phase is complete, the system automatically executes 
proprietary point-processing algorithms to process the captured image. The system can 
generate an accurate digital 3D model of the target space; automatically fuse image texture 
onto 3D model geometry; export file formats ready for commercial, high-end design; and 
import them into 2D/3D computer-aided design (CAD) packages. 
Terrestrial laser scanning technology is well established as a valuable tool in practice 
and is currently used in a variety of industries. According to industry analysts, laser scanner 
manufacturers and related software and service providers report strong activity across many 
markets, including shipbuilding, offshore construction and repair, onshore oil and gas, fossil 
                                            
 
 
1 The two largest U.S. shipyards that construct aircraft carriers and submarines are also transitioning 
into CPLM solutions. Typically, CPLM vendors do not focus efforts on the shipbuilding industry 
because of its size relative to other products, such as automotive or aerospace. Having a CPLM tool 
designed specifically for an industry has a significant impact on the tool’s efficiency within that 
industry. 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= - 187 - 
and nuclear power, civil and transportation infrastructure, building, automotive and 
construction equipment, manufacturing, and forensics (Greaves & Jenkins, 2007).  
Research Approaches and Methods  
The current research developed estimates of the impacts of the three technologies 
(3DLST, 3DP, and CPLM) on fleet maintenance costs by comparing the costs of different 
make/buy strategies. The background, issues, and cost estimates were then used in the 
integrated risk management approach that includes a real options analysis.  
To estimate the make/buy strategy costs, the traditional investment analysis 
approach was reverse-engineered using the following steps:  
 Describe the make/buy strategies. 
 Estimate revenues that reflect benefits using a market-comparable approach.  
 Estimate a return on investment (ROI) for each strategy using Knowledge 
Value Added models.  
 Estimate costs of each make/buy strategy using the ROI estimates and 
estimates of benefits.  
 Estimate potential cost savings by comparing costs of make/buy strategies.  
The Knowledge Value Added (KVA) modeling methodology is central to estimating 
the make/buy strategy costs. KVA measures the value provided by human capital and IT 
assets by an organization, process, or function at the subprocess level. It monetizes the 
outputs of all resources, including intangible knowledge assets. Capturing the value 
embedded in an organization’s core processes, employees, and IT enables calculation of 
the actual cost and revenue of a product or service.  
Total value is captured in two key metrics: return on investment (ROI) and return on 
knowledge (ROK). Although ROI is the traditional financial ratio, ROK identifies how a 
specific process converts existing knowledge into producing outputs so decision-makers can 
quantify costs and measure value derived from investments in human capital and IT assets. 
A higher ROK signifies better utilization of assets. If technology investments do not improve 
the ROK value of a given process, steps must be taken to improve that process’s function 
and performance. 
The goal is to determine which core processes provide the highest ROIs and ROKs, 
and to make suggested process improvements based on the results. In the current work, 
KVA is used to measure the benefits of adopting the three technologies for ship 
maintenance. This analysis provides a means to check the reliability of prior studies’ 
estimates of the potential ROI core process improvements from using CPLM, AM (3DP), and 
3DLST in ship-maintenance core processes in the U.S. Navy yards.  
Integrated Risk Management and Strategic Real Options Analysis 
Integrated Risk Management (IRM) is an eight-step, quantitative software-based 
modeling approach for the objective quantification of risk (cost, schedule, technical 
performance), flexibility, strategy, and decision analysis. The method can be applied to 
program management, resource portfolio allocation, return on investment to the military 
(maximizing expected military value and objective value quantification of nonrevenue 
government projects), analysis of alternatives or strategic flexibility options, capability 
analysis, prediction modeling, and general decision analytics. The method and tool set 
provide the ability to consider hundreds of alternatives with budget, performance, and 
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schedule uncertainty, and provide ways to help the decision-maker maximize capability and 
readiness at the lowest cost.  
In this study, IRM provides a way to differentiate among various alternatives for 
implementation of 3DLST, CPLM, and 3DP with respect to ship maintenance processes, 
and to postulate where the greatest benefit could be achieved for the available investment 
from within the portfolio of alternatives. As a strategy is formed and a plan developed for its 
implementation, the toolset provides for inclusion of important risk factors and allows for 
continuous updating and evaluation by the program manager.  
Cost Saving Estimates 
Several challenges arise in expanding previous research on Navy investment 
strategies in new technologies to investigate make/buy strategies. One challenge is that 
previous research was often based on a specific portion of the parts used in Naval ship 
maintenance (e.g., high-, medium-, or low-complexity parts). These product types differ in 
their costs and market comparable values, and therefore, in their contributions to fleet 
readiness. Make/buy analysis should consider the potential for in-sourcing all three types of 
parts. A second challenge is differentiating costs generated by industry from costs 
generated by parts production within the Navy. These costs differ due primarily to 
differences in labor costs. A third challenge is the description of the make/buy strategies.  
Describing Make/Buy Strategies  
Estimates of annual production rates are based on data collected for one depot that 
manufactures approximately 27,000 parts per year, of which 25% were high complexity, 
50% were medium complexity, and 25% were low complexity (Mackley, 2014). Table 2 
shows the estimated industry and Navy production rates for five make/buy strategies 
ranging from all-buy (100% by industry) to all-make (100% by Navy). These estimates 
assume that the Navy would produce highly complex parts first (in the lowest “make” 
strategy), then add medium-complexity parts as it increased the fraction of parts made, and 
produce low-complexity parts only in strategies that have the Navy making all the parts (in 
the highest “make” strategy).  
 Annual Production Rate Estimates of Five Make/Buy Strategies 
 
The production rates reflect two extreme strategies and three shared-production 
strategies. The first strategy (0% Navy production) is the extreme strategy in which all parts 
are made by industry. This strategy is relatively close to the current conditions in which most 
parts production is outsourced to industry. The second strategy (25% Navy production) 
reflects the Navy’s producing all complex parts and outsourcing all medium-complexity and 
low-complexity (aka “simple”) parts to industry. The third strategy (50% Navy production) 
reflects the Navy’s producing all high-complexity parts and half of the medium-complexity 
parts, while outsourcing half of the medium complexity parts and all simple parts to industry. 
The fourth strategy (75% Navy production) reflects the Navy producing all high- and 
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medium-complexity parts and outsourcing all simple parts. The last strategy (100% Navy 
production) is the extreme strategy in which all parts are made by the Navy.  
As shown in Table 2, the “Parts Produced by Industry” and “Parts Produced by Navy” 
columns, the Navy increases production as the make/buy strategies shift from low 
percentage made by the Navy to higher percentages made. The “Total Parts Produced” 
column shows that these strategies reflect shifts in production between industry and the 
Navy, not changes in the total number of parts produced.  
Estimating Revenues That Reflect Benefits  
Benefits were estimated by multiplying the production rates in Table 2 by the 
average part values. The conservative $6,000 average value of a complex part is supported 
by an interview of an expert by one of the NPS research team. That expert said, “Externally 
we see charges anywhere between $6,000 to $8,000 dollars and upwards of $15,000 per 
model” and later confirmed that $12,000 was “at the upper end of your range” (personal 
interview summarized in Kenney, 2013). The modelers assumed that medium-complexity 
parts had an average value of $3,000 each and that low-complexity parts had an average 
value of $1,000 each. Table 3 shows the estimated values of produced parts for each 
make/buy strategy.  
 Estimated Annual Benefits of Five Make/Buy Strategies 
 
Note. Benefits are estimated in thousands of dollars per year. 
Estimating Returns on Investment 
Estimated Returns on Investment (ROI) were generated with KVA models. Each 
KVA model reflected the appropriate average 2013 labor costs (Navy) based on work by 
Mackley (2014) and market value of the common unit of output (high-, medium-, or low-
complexity parts). The estimated Returns on Investment are shown in Table 4.  
 Estimated Returns on Investment (ROI) of Five Make/Buy Strategies 
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The relatively large returns in Table 4 are consistent with the savings found by 
industry.  
Estimating Production Costs and Cost Savings 
Costs for each make/buy scenario can be estimated using the definition of Return on 
Investment:  
ROI = (Benefits – Costs) / Costs 
which can alternatively be written as 
Cost = Benefits / (ROI + 1). 
The equation above was used with the benefits (Table 3) and Returns on Investment 
(Table 4) to estimate the costs of each make/buy strategy. The total cost of each make/buy 
scenario (rows in Table 5) is the sum of six costs: the costs generated by industry to 
produce high-, medium-, and low-complexity parts plus the costs generated by the Navy to 
produce high-, medium-, and low-complexity parts. In some strategies some of these costs 
are zero, such as the Navy cost when 100% of parts are produced by industry, or industry 
cost when 100% of parts are produced by the Navy. Capturing all six cost components for 
each strategy assures the inclusion of all relevant production costs.  
 Estimated Annual Costs of Five Make/Buy Strategies 
 
Figure 2 shows these results in graphical form by plotting the costs in the “Parts Cost 
by Industry,” “Parts Cost by Navy,” and “Total Parts Production Cost” columns of Table 5.  
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 Estimated Annual Costs of Five Make/Buy Strategies  
Savings increase with the volume of parts manufactured by the Navy (more in-
sourcing). Savings at the depot studied by having the Navy instead of industry produce all 
parts are estimated to be $12,673,000 ($28,152,000–$15,479,000) per year at the depot 
investigated. Assuming 10 depots that apply this strategy implies savings that exceed $120 
million annually. For context, these estimated savings can be compared to the threshold set 
by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012: 
(e) Determination relating to the conversion [from outsourcing to in-sourcing] 
of certain functions … in determining whether a function should be converted 
to performance by Department of Defense civilian employees, the Secretary 
of Defense shall … 
(C) Ensure that the difference in the cost of performing the function by a 
contractor compared to the cost of performing the function by Department of 
Defense civilian employees would be equal to or exceed the lesser of … 
(I) 10 percent of the personnel-related costs for performance of the function; 
or 
(ii)) $10,000,000 
The potential savings forecasted above far exceed the $10 million threshold set by 
the statute, thereby supporting the adoption and use of these technologies.  
Real Options Analysis 
Four major strategies were identified and solved using ROV SLS technology as 
options for the decision-making process concerning planning for further action: 
 Strategy A: Base case. Keep outsource purchasing vast majority of 
inventory. This is a risky strategy. Opportunity losses are occurring due to 
missed financial savings and control over the process in the long run. 
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 Strategy B: Outsource. Buy all 100%: Outsource all manufacturing to 
outside contractors. This strategy is risky because it leads to dependency on 
organizations that are outside the control of the Navy. 
o Open Architecture. To reduce the risk of dependency on a few 
vendors, the Navy could implement an Open Architecture principle 
that provides interchangeability of critical parts on a ship without any 
loss of functionality. That gives the Navy the flexibility to choose 
vendors based on objective parameters (price, frequency, availability). 
o Exit. This strategy is not expensive to abandon. The Navy can easily 
go to other options without any substantial costs. 
 Strategy C: Insource. Make all 100%: This is the option to manufacture 
everything “in-house” immediately. The ROI is high but the cost and risks are 
very high if it does not work out. 
o Invest 100%. Pros: savings may be captured by the use of 3DLST, 
3DP, and CPLM for fleet maintenance and modernization. Cons: 
additional investment in the technologies costs and risks of immediate 
in-sourcing. 
o Exit. This option is very costly to abandon because of the high 
investment costs. 
 Strategy D: Sequential Compound Option 
o Phase I. 25% PLM: Implement PLM. This is a strategic business 
approach applying a consistent set of business solutions in support of 
the collaborative creation, management, dissemination, and use of 
product definition information across the extended enterprise. 
o Phase II. 50%: 3D Laser Scanning Technology. This is a small-scale 
investment over time with the ability to exit and walk away should the 
technology not work out as expected. Phasing investments over time 
hedges any downside risks and reduces any risks of large lump-sum 
investments. 
 Exit. This technology could still be useful for other options. 
o Phase III. 75%: Additive Manufacturing, 3DP. This includes 3DLST 
models, conversion to Stereo-lithography STL, Revision of STL 
Models, AM Machine Setup, and implementation. 
 Exit. 3D technologies could still be applied in other operations 
of the Navy. 
o Phase IV. 100%: Final Phase. Implement the 3DP, CPLM, 3DLST 
technologies for all required inventory parts. At this point, the project 
is too costly to abandon. The Navy will choose to implement the 
technology limited to the most critical parts of its operations. 
To calculate volatility for use in the Real Option Valuation process, Risk Simulator 
was used. Monte Carlo simulation was applied for estimating Volatility. Figure 3 illustrates 
six different input assumptions (green cells) with output being estimated as the annual 
benefit of total production of the parts (yellow cell). The result is shown in Figure 26. The 
coefficient of variation of 33.61% for the High Risk and 23.62% for the Medium Risk AFCAA 
settings are the volatilities used in the analyses. 
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The results (Figure 3) show that Strategy D has the highest value. This Sequential 
Compound Option involves implementing new technologies in phases, thus giving 
management the ability to exit at any stage of the project while minimizing the risk of losses.  
 
 Real Options Analysis Results (in $ Millions) 
Conclusions and Recommendations  
The current work investigated the potential of three emerging technologies (3DP, 
3DLST, and CPLM) to generate cost saving in U.S. naval ship maintenance and 
modernization. The challenges posed by fleet maintenance and modernization and an 
introduction to in-sourcing and its history within the U.S. federal government were described 
as a context for the work. An extensive introduction to the three technologies was followed 
by a description of the research approach and methods. Then cost savings using the 
technologies under different in-sourcing (make/buy) scenarios were estimated. Real options 
were used to investigate several in-sourcing versus outsourcing alternatives. The results of 
these analyses are the basis for recommendations for practice.  
Potential cost savings due to the adoption and use of the three technologies were 
estimated to increase as more parts were manufactured by the U.S. Navy (i.e., insourced), 
with savings of more than $120 million annually if all parts were insourced. In-house 
manufacture of complex parts was found to generate the largest savings. In combination 
with other research, this suggests that complex parts for which few copies are needed are 
the best candidates for initial in-sourcing using the technologies.  
Of the four make/buy strategies analyzed, Strategy D of the phased implementation 
approach has the highest strategic value. This strategy involves implementing new 
technologies in phases, thus giving management the ability to exit at any stage of the 
project, while minimizing the risk of losses.  
The results have several significant implications for fleet maintenance and 
modernization practice. The finding of significant potential savings with in-sourcing suggests 
that the three technologies have created a potential shift in the optimal acquisition modes for 
fleet parts. Based on the RAND model of in-sourcing and outsourcing acquisition, as the 
costs of producing few more different types of parts (e.g., simple versus complex and 
frequent versus rare) drop with the new technologies, the Navy will be able to capture more 
benefits by in-sourcing more parts. This concept is shown in Figure 4 as a shift from the 
dashed lines to the solid lines that include a larger portfolio of parts.  
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 Based on Conceptual Sourcing Framework  
(Drew et al., 2013) 
Recommendations for the U.S. Navy include the following: 
 Adopt the three technologies investigated. 
 Test in-sourcing with these technologies starting with low volume complex 
products. 
 Plan to increase the scale of in-sourcing after developing processes and a 
track record to justify expansion. 
 Work to change acquisition regulations and procedures that impede the use 
of in-sourcing for parts manufacturing. 
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